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AN APPRAISAL OF THE MODEL 
BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT’S 
APPRAISAL RIGHTS PROVISIONS 
MARY SIEGEL* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
The Delaware General Corporation Law1 and the Model Business 
Corporation Act (MBCA)2 have long been regarded as the two templates of 
corporate law.3 In approaching the optimal way to regulate various corporate 
issues, these two statutes have often reached similar conclusions.4 In the area of 
shareholder appraisal rights,5 however, the two statutes are diametrically 
opposed on many key elements. Most notably, MBCA chapter 13 on appraisal 
rights differs from Delaware’s statutory appraisal provisions in four 
fundamental respects: (1) events that will trigger a shareholder’s right to 
demand appraisal, (2) timing of the corporation’s payment to shareholders 
demanding appraisal rights, (3) allocation of court costs and shareholder 
expenses, and (4) whether the market-out exception to appraisal rights is 
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 1. DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8, §§ 101–398 (2001). 
 2. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT (2008). 
 3. See William J. Carney & George B. Shepard, The Mystery of Delaware Law’s Continuing 
Success, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 48–49 (2009) (stating that a number of state corporate law committees 
monitor changes made to both the MBCA and the Delaware General Corporation Law in determining 
what revisions to make to their own statutes). 
 4. For example, the MBCA and Delaware both allow director exculpation for breaches of the 
fiduciary duty of care. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 2.02(b)(4) (2008); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) 
(2001). Additionally, plurality voting for the election of directors is the default rule in both the MBCA 
and Delaware. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 10.22 (2008); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216(3) (2001).  
 5. Appraisal rights allow shareholders to object to the consideration to be received in certain 
corporate transactions and, instead, require corporations to pay shareholders the fair value of their 
stock as determined in an appraisal proceeding. See Hideki Kanda & Saul Levmore, The Appraisal 
Remedy and the Goals of Corporate Law, 32 UCLA L. REV. 429, 429 (1985) (“The appraisal remedy in 
corporate law confers upon shareholders a statutory right to dissent from specified fundamental or 
structural changes in the life of their corporation. The remedy requires the corporation to facilitate the 
shareholders’ withdrawal by buying back their shares for fair value, or its equivalent, as determined 
through appraisal proceedings.”). 
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limited only to appraisal-triggering transactions that are not conflict-of-interest 
transactions. These competing models provide state legislatures options for 
achieving differing policy aims when enacting appraisal-rights legislation. 
Parts II–V of this article will address each of these four fundamental 
differences between the two appraisal statutes. After delineating the statutory 
differences, each part will explain the practical effects that flow from the 
competing statutory mandates and the resulting policy issues that motivated the 
choices that are ultimately reflected in these statutes. Finally, each part will 
show how state legislatures, faced with these two opposing models, have reacted 
to these four provisions. This article demonstrates that the vast majority of 
jurisdictions6 have chosen to reject Delaware’s approach and, instead, follow the 
MBCA on the first three issues. On the fourth issue, however, the majority of 
jurisdictions that have adopted a market-out exception in their appraisal 
statutes have followed the Delaware model. One wildcard in this last result is 
that, unlike the other three provisions, which have a long history in the MBCA, 
limiting the market-out exception to non-conflict transactions is fairly new: in 
1999, the Committee on Corporate Laws (Committee), which writes the 
MBCA, adopted the country’s first conflict exception to the market-out. As a 
result, lawmakers have had substantially less experience with this conflict 
exception and less time to evaluate its merits compared to the other three 
issues. 
II 
APPRAISAL-TRIGGERING TRANSACTIONS 
A. The Statutory Language 
MBCA section 13.02(a) lists five mandatory appraisal triggers, each of 
which specifically defines events that require the corporation to offer its 
shareholders appraisal rights: (1) mergers, (2) share exchanges, (3) dispositions 
of assets, (4) amendments to the articles, and (5) conversion or domestication.7 
Delaware, in contrast, mandates appraisal rights only for some mergers.8 Both 
 
 6. This article will use the term “jurisdictions” to refer to the fifty states and the District of 
Columbia. 
 7. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 13.02(a)(1)–(4), (6)–(8) (2008) for a list of mandatory 
appraisal triggers. Although the MBCA divides conversion and domestication triggers into three 
subsections, these triggers are similar in nature, and are often grouped together in state statutes; 
therefore, this article will treat them as a single trigger. 
 8. Although Delaware affords appraisal rights to shareholders in many mergers, see DEL. CODE. 
ANN. tit. 8, §§ 251, 252, 253, 254, 257, 258, 263, 264 (2001), it denies appraisal rights in certain specified 
merger situations. For example, when a surviving company issues twenty percent or less of its stock, 
and its charter and outstanding shares are not changed, or in certain holding-company mergers, 
Delaware does not grant appraisal rights to shareholders of the surviving or holding company. Id. §§ 
251(g), 262(b). Similarly, in short-form mergers, Delaware does not grant appraisal rights to the 
parent’s shareholders. Id. §§ 253(d), 262(b)(3). References to “mergers” in this article include 
“consolidations,” which is a merger-like transaction in which the surviving entity is newly formed. 
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Delaware and the MBCA permit a corporation to offer appraisal rights for 
other events not mandated by their respective statutes.9 
B.  Practical Effects and Policy Issues 
Clearly, the effect of five appraisal triggers under the MBCA, compared to 
only one in Delaware, is that the MBCA offers more opportunity for 
shareholders to demand their appraisal rights. Whether increased opportunity 
to exercise these rights is good corporate policy depends on one’s view of 
appraisal rights and their function.10 On the one hand, the numerous appraisal 
triggers in the MBCA allow shareholders dissatisfied with the consideration in 
major transactions, such as mergers, share exchanges, and significant 
dispositions of assets, to seek alternative valuation through their appraisal 
rights. Moreover, because each of the five triggers would significantly alter the 
nature of the shareholders’ investment, the MBCA’s broader range of triggers 
treats similarly situated shareholders more consistently than does Delaware’s 
single trigger. On the other hand, opponents of multiple triggers contend that 
these triggers offer multiple opportunities for the minority of shares who 
demand appraisal rights to thwart the will of the majority of shares who support 
the appraisal-triggering transaction.11 Furthermore, opponents of the MBCA’s 
numerous appraisal triggers might note that, whereas some appraisal triggers, 
like mergers,12 cause the absorbing corporation to bear the costs and expenses of 
 
 9. See id. § 262(c) (“Any corporation may provide in its certificate of incorporation that appraisal 
rights under this section shall be available for the shares of any class or series of its stock as a result of 
an amendment to its certificate of incorporation, any merger or consolidation in which the corporation 
is a constituent corporation or the sale of all or substantially all of the assets of the corporation.”); 
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 13.02(a)(5) (2008) (“A shareholder is entitled to appraisal rights . . . in the 
event of . . . any other amendment to the articles of incorporation, merger, share exchange or 
disposition of assets to the extent provided by the articles of incorporation, bylaws or a resolution of 
the board of directors.”). 
 10. Commentators cite various purposes for appraisal rights, including compensation for loss of 
shareholder veto power (after unanimous shareholder voting requirements eroded), protection of the 
majority from minority-initiated injunction suits, provision of a cash exit option at fair value, and 
creation of a monitor for conflict-of-interest transactions. See Mary Siegel, Back to the Future: 
Appraisal Rights in the Twenty-First Century, 32 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 79, 93–97, 105, 110 (1995) (finding 
cash exit at fair value and conflict-of-interest monitoring the most cogent of these proposed purposes); 
Barry M. Wertheimer, The Purpose of the Shareholder’s Appraisal Remedy, 65 TENN. L. REV. 661, 678–
79 (1998) (surveying proposed purposes for appraisal rights and finding that most of these purposes are 
“animated by a goal of minority shareholder protection”). 
 11. The majority may find its appraisal-triggering transaction thwarted if the agreement contains a 
commonly used “appraisal out” covenant, which allows a corporation to back out of the deal when a 
specified percentage of shares demand appraisal. See, e.g., In re MONY Grp. Inc. S’holder Litig., 853 
A.2d 661, 670 (Del. Ch. 2004) (discussing, in the context of a merger, the details and modification of an 
“appraisal out” term). Moreover, parties to a potential transaction may not be willing to enter into a 
transaction if there is a risk that they will have to finance stockholders who cash out through the 
appraisal mechanism. 
 12. See Siegel, supra note 10, at 122 n.201 (noting that, in mergers, the acquiring corporation “most 
often pays the appraisal bill”). 
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appraisal rights, other appraisal triggers, like charter amendments,13 cause a 
direct transfer of wealth among the corporation’s existing shareholders from 
those not demanding appraisal to those demanding appraisal. State legislatures 
balance these countervailing concerns when adopting appraisal triggers. Their 
choices, explored in the section below, reflect their resolution of these 
competing issues. 
C.  Reaction from the State Legislatures 
All jurisdictions offer appraisal rights for mergers, as does the MBCA.14 
Moreover, thirty-five jurisdictions allow for private ordering that authorizes 
corporations to add other appraisal triggers,15 as do both Delaware and the 
MBCA. Only two jurisdictions, however, follow the Delaware statute in 
providing mergers as the sole statutorily-required appraisal trigger.16 The vast 
majority of jurisdictions have overwhelmingly supported offering appraisal 
rights for a variety of additional triggers, as does the MBCA. Specifically, all 
forty-four jurisdictions that authorize a compulsory share exchange17 recognize 
appraisal rights for this transaction.18 Moreover, forty-seven jurisdictions offer 
appraisal rights for significant dispositions of assets,19 thirty-nine jurisdictions 
grant appraisal rights for certain amendments to the articles of incorporation,20 
 
 13. As charter amendments involve only a single corporate actor, appraisal proceeds are paid by 
the corporation at the expense of the remaining shareholders. See also MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 
13.02(a)(4), (6)–(8) (2008) (granting appraisal rights for domestications and conversions, which also 
involve only a single corporate actor). 
 14. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 13.02 statutory comparison (1)(A) (2008) (confirming that all 
jurisdictions grant appraisal rights for at least some mergers). 
 15. In addition to Delaware, jurisdictions providing for private ordering are: Alabama, Arizona, 
Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, 
Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New 
Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, 
Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 
13.02(a)(5) (2008). In addition, although neither the MBCA nor Delaware authorizes appraisal rights 
for control-share acquisitions, six states have added this appraisal trigger: Indiana, Maine, Mississippi, 
Oklahoma, South Dakota, and Virginia. 
 16. The District of Columbia and Kansas grant appraisal rights only in the event of merger. See 
D.C. CODE § 29-101.73 (2010); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6712 (2009). 
 17. Note that Delaware does not recognize the compulsory share exchange transaction. See 
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 11.03 statutory comparison (2008). 
 18. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 11.03 statutory comparison (2008) for a list of 
jurisdictions recognizing compulsory share transactions and granting appraisal rights for these 
transactions. 
 19. Jurisdictions granting appraisal rights for a significant disposition of assets are: Alabama, 
Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, 
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, 
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, 
North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, 
South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and 
Wyoming. 
 20. Jurisdictions granting appraisal rights upon certain amendments to the corporation’s articles of 
incorporation are: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, 
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and nineteen jurisdictions provide appraisal rights for certain conversions and 
domestications.21 Thus, the vast majority of jurisdictions, ninety-six percent, 
support the MBCA’s approach of recognizing a variety of appraisal-triggering 
events. 
III 
PAYMENT OF THE STOCK’S UNDISPUTED FAIR VALUE 
A.  The Statutory Language 
With one exception,22 section 13.24 of the MBCA requires the corporation 
to pay shareholders “the amount the corporation estimates to be the fair value 
of their shares, plus interest”23 early on in the appraisal proceeding.24 The 
comment to section 13.24 explains this requirement: 
Since . . . all rights as a shareholder are terminated with the deposit of that 
shareholder’s shares, the former shareholder should have immediate use of such 
money. A difference of opinion over the total amount to be paid should not 
delay payment of the amount that is undisputed. Thus, the corporation must pay 
its estimate of fair value, plus interest from the effective date of the corporate 
action, without waiting for the conclusion of the appraisal proceeding.25 
The concept of prepaying the fair value of the stock has a long history in the 
MBCA. Both the 1978 and 1984 revisions of chapter 13 required prepayment; 
the Committee’s 1999 revision simply reaffirmed this requirement and fine-
tuned the language.26 
 
Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, 
Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, 
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, 
Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. 
 21. Jurisdictions granting appraisal rights upon corporate conversion or domestication, or both, 
are: Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, 
Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South 
Dakota, Texas, and Wyoming. 
 22. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 13.24(a) (2008) (providing an exception for shares described in 
section 13.25(a), which are shares a shareholder failed to certify that were owned as of the record date 
set for the transaction). 
 23. Id. § 13.24(a). The MBCA specifies that the corporation must pay interest at the “rate of 
interest on judgments” used in the jurisdiction on the effective date of the transaction. Id. § 13.01(5). 
 24. Specifically, MBCA section 13.24(a) requires the corporation to pay shareholders the 
undisputed fair value “within [thirty] days after the form required by section 13.22(b)(2)(ii) is due . . . .” 
MBCA section 13.22(b) requires the corporation to send shareholders notice of their right to demand 
appraisal rights within ten days after the corporate action triggering appraisal rights is completed. In 
turn, MBCA section 13.22(b)(2)(ii) requires the corporation to set the due date for appraisal notice 
forms and specifies that the due date must be between forty and sixty days after the corporation sends 
shareholders notice of their appraisal rights. 
 25. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 13.24 official cmt. (1999). 
 26. The 1978, 1984, and 1999 versions each required prepayment. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 
81(f)(3) (1978); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 13.24(a) (1984); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 13.24(a) (1999). 
The 1999 revisions, however, fine-tuned the prepayment language. Compare MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT 
§ 81(f)(3) (1978) (requiring the corporation to pay dissenters the corporation’s estimate of fair value 
“[i]mmediately upon effectuation of the proposed corporate action”), with MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 
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In contrast, section 262(h) of the Delaware statute requires the court to 
determine the fair value in an appraisal proceeding,27 and section 262(i) requires 
the court to direct the corporation to pay such fair value, plus interest, to those 
shareholders entitled to such payment at the conclusion of the proceeding.28 
Therefore, absent a settlement, shareholders in an appraisal proceeding will not 
receive any money for their shares until the entire appraisal proceeding 
concludes. This is so even though Delaware law holds that shareholders 
demanding appraisal forfeit their shareholder status upon the effective date of 
the appraisal-triggering transaction.29 
B.  Practical Effects and Policy Issues 
The MBCA’s requirement that the corporation pay the shareholder the 
undisputed fair value of the stock early on in the appraisal process has three 
practical effects. First, this requirement arms shareholders with some money—
the undisputed fair value—which shareholders may use to continue their fight 
with the corporation. Second, it reduces the amount that is in dispute: if the 
shareholder and the corporation believe that the fair value is $100 and $70 per 
share, respectively, the two sides are now clearly fighting over only $30 per 
share. Third, if the corporation’s estimate of fair value30 is greater than the 
amount ultimately determined by the court, the corporation will have paid this 
greater amount to the shareholder without any statutory right to require the 
shareholder to return the difference between the court’s determination of fair 
value and the corporation’s estimate of fair value. As a result, knowing that its 
payment of fair value will be a sunk cost will cause a corporation to be judicious 
about the amount it declares to be the fair value of the stock. 
In contrast, Delaware’s appraisal process requires the corporation to pay 
fair value, plus interest, as determined by the court at the termination of the 
appraisal proceeding. Thus, in Delaware, shareholders will not be able to 
finance appraisal litigation simply by surrendering their shares;31 as in all other 
 
13.24(a) (1999) (specifying that the corporation must pay shareholders the undisputed fair value, in 
cash, within thirty days after shareholders submit the required form). 
 27. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (2008). 
 28. Id. § 262(i). Although the court has discretion to vary the interest rate, the statutory default 
rate is five percent above the Federal Reserve discount rate. Id. § 262(h). 
 29. See Lewis v. Anderson, 477 A.2d 1040, 1045 (Del. 1984) (noting that, upon the effective date of 
a merger, shareholders no longer have standing to maintain a derivative suit against the corporation); 
R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI & JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND 
BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 9.44(J) (3d ed. 1998) (“The change in stockholder status takes place 
upon the effective date of the merger, with certain exceptions.”). As noted above, in Delaware, 
appraisal rights are only triggered by certain mergers. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(b) (2001); see supra 
note 8 and accompanying text. 
 30. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 13.24(b)(2) (2008) requires that the corporation’s estimate of fair 
value be at least equivalent to the fair value number that the corporation listed on its section 13.22 
form. 
 31. See supra text accompanying notes 27–29 (explaining that shareholders in Delaware who 
exercise their appraisal rights do not receive payment until the conclusion of the appraisal 
proceedings). 
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litigation, shareholders (or their attorneys) must have the funds to sustain 
litigation. Furthermore, paying shareholders at the conclusion of the appraisal 
proceeding neither isolates the amount in dispute, as in an MBCA proceeding, 
nor generates any possibility that the corporation might overpay its former 
shareholders. Of course, the pressure to settle without a full appraisal 
proceeding is significant not only for the shareholder demanding appraisal, but 
also for the corporation, which will face its own legal expenses, extensive 
discovery requests, a complicated trial on valuation, and a statutorily designated 
interest rate from the date of the merger to the date it pays the judgment. 
The policy issues resulting from these two different approaches are 
significant. As noted above, the MBCA’s requirement that corporations pay 
shareholders the undisputed value of their stock arms them with funds that the 
shareholders can use to litigate against the corporation. The comment to 
MBCA section 13.24 acknowledges that this prepayment “changes the relative 
balance between the corporation and shareholders. . . .”32 Accordingly it is 
worth considering whether chapter 13 encourages shareholder litigation and, if 
so, whether such encouragement is good public policy. Supporters argue that 
this prepayment feature identifies the amount that is actually in dispute, and 
such identification encourages settlement: both sides can tangibly recognize that 
the amount in dispute is, perhaps, fairly small. 
Related to whether the MBCA’s prepayment provision encourages 
litigation is the issue of why the MBCA treats appraisal litigation differently 
from all other shareholder litigation. As noted above, the comment to the 
MBCA responds to this question by reasoning that, because the shareholder’s 
status as a shareholder ends when the shareholder deposits her shares in 
conjunction with her election of appraisal rights, she should be compensated 
immediately for giving up her stock, at least to the extent the fair value of the 
stock is not in dispute. Delaware implicitly rejects this argument because 
shareholders in Delaware corporations do not receive any payment prior to the 
termination of the appraisal proceeding even though their status as 
shareholders ends earlier in the appraisal process than do their counterparts 
under the MBCA.33 
 
 32. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 13.24 official cmt. (1999). 
 33. The reason a shareholder’s status as a shareholder ends sooner in Delaware than under the 
MBCA is that a shareholder in Delaware must submit notice of her intent to demand appraisal prior to 
the effective date of the appraisal-triggering transaction and, in most transactions, the rights of the 
shareholder terminate as soon as the appraisal-triggering transaction is consummated. See DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 8, § 262(k) (2008) (“From and after the effective date of the merger or consolidation, no 
stockholder who has demanded appraisal rights . . . shall be entitled to vote such stock for any purpose 
or to receive payment of dividends or other distributions on the stock . . . .”). In contrast, the MBCA 
does not require shareholders to submit notice of their intent to elect appraisal rights until after the 
conclusion of the appraisal-triggering transaction; thus, these shareholders will first begin their 
appraisal election when the transaction is completed. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. One 
exception to Delaware’s prior notice requirement applies in the context of short-form mergers and 
mergers approved by stockholders’ written consents. In these transactions, the deadline to demand 
appraisal rights is twenty days after the corporation mails shareholders notice of appraisal rights. If the 
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C.  Reaction from the State Legislatures 
Like the MBCA, thirty-four jurisdictions require the corporation to pay the 
undisputed fair value of the stock prior to the conclusion of the appraisal 
proceedings.34 Because more than two-thirds of the jurisdictions have chosen to 
follow the MBCA, their choices demonstrate a strong endorsement of the 
policies that underlie the MBCA’s prepayment requirement. Seven other 
jurisdictions require the corporation to offer to pay its estimate of fair value of 
the stock prior to the conclusion of the appraisal proceedings.35 These 
jurisdictions, however, differ materially from the MBCA’s prepayment 
requirement because these jurisdictions do not require prepayment; instead, if a 
shareholder rejects the corporation’s offer to pay as inadequate, that 
shareholder will not receive any payment until the conclusion of the appraisal 
proceedings. Finally, nine jurisdictions follow the Delaware statutory provision 
that does not require the corporation to make any payment or offer of payment 
until the conclusion of the appraisal proceeding.36 Although these nine 
jurisdictions are a distinct numerical minority, it is notable that many are large 
corporate states, such as California, Maryland, and New York. Taken together, 
the ten jurisdictions that do not require the corporation to prepay its 
shareholders, plus the seven that require only an offer of payment, amount to 
only thirty-three percent of jurisdictions that reject a prepayment requirement, 
whereas sixty-seven percent of jurisdictions embrace it. 
 
corporation sends shareholders notice of appraisal rights less than twenty days prior to the effective 
date of the transaction, the shareholders’ appraisal demand will not be due until after the effective date 
of the transaction. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(d)(2) (2001) (requiring the corporation to provide 
notice of the short-form merger within ten days of the effective date of the transaction and requiring a 
shareholder response within twenty days of the mailing of the notice). 
 34. Of these jurisdictions, ten jurisdictions follow the 1999 revision to the MBCA, which requires 
the corporation to pay shareholders the fair value of their shares, in cash, within thirty days of the 
shareholder’s perfection of appraisal rights. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 13.24(a) (1999). The states 
adopting the 1999 language verbatim are: Connecticut, Idaho, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Mississippi, 
Nevada, South Dakota, Virginia, and West Virginia. The remaining twenty-four jurisdictions that 
follow the MBCA have not adopted the exact language from the 1999 revisions, but in substance, each 
of the following jurisdictions requires the corporation to pay shareholders the fair value of their shares 
shortly after the commencement of the corporate action giving rise to appraisal rights and the 
shareholders’ perfection of appraisal rights: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Hawaii, Illinois, 
Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North 
Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin, 
and Wyoming. 
 35. These jurisdictions are: Alabama, District of Columbia, Georgia, Florida, Louisiana, Rhode 
Island, and Texas. 
 36. The jurisdictions following the Delaware statute are: California, Kansas, Maryland, New 
Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, and Pennsylvania. 
SIEGEL 12/28/2010   
Winter 2011] THE MBCA’S APPRAISAL RIGHTS PROVISIONS 239 
IV 
ALLOCATION OF COURT COSTS AND EXPENSES OF THE APPRAISAL 
PROCEEDING 
A.  The Statutory Language 
As was the case with the prepayment of the fair value of stock, the 1999 
revision of chapter 13 fine-tuned the language of the 1978 and 1984 versions of 
chapter 13 relating to allocation of costs and expenses, but it continued to 
support the substantive decisions that the prior versions had embodied in the 
statute.37 Currently, MBCA section 13.31(a) requires the court to determine the 
court costs of the proceeding, including the compensation and expenses of 
court-appointed appraisers. Section 13.31(a) then requires the court to assess 
these costs “against the corporation.”38 Although the statute permits the court 
to make an exception to such assessment when all or some of the shareholders 
demanding appraisal “acted arbitrarily, vexatiously, or not in good faith,”39 the 
statutory presumption is that the corporation must absorb the court costs of the 
appraisal proceeding. Whereas section 13.31(a) creates a statutory presumption 
that the corporation will pay the court costs, section 13.31(b), in contrast, does 
not create any presumption regarding the parties’ expenses.40 Therefore, the 
parties are presumed to bear their own expenses unless their conduct trips 
section 13.31(b), which allows the court to assess the expenses of the respective 
parties41 upon the occurrence of certain triggering events. The statute 
 
 37. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 81(i)(1) (1978); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 13.31 (1984); MODEL 
BUS. CORP. ACT § 13.31 (1999). The 1999 version also added section (d), which allows shareholders 
who are owed required payments under sections 13.24, 13.25, and 13.26, to sue the corporation directly 
and entitles shareholders who receive a court award under section (d) to all of that suit’s costs and 
expenses. 
 38. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 13.31(a) (2008). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Unlike section 13.31(a), section 13.31(b) contains no explicit presumption that the parties’ 
respective expenses will be allocated to the corporation. By not including an explicit presumption on 
shifting expenses, the MBCA incorporated the implicit assumption that parties will bear their own 
expenses, absent a showing that either party engaged in bad conduct. See Alfred F. Conard, 
Amendments of Model Business Corporation Act Affecting Dissenters’ Rights (Sections 73, 74, 80 and 
81), 33 BUS. LAW. 2587, 2604 (1978) (explaining that the 1978 MBCA revision, unlike the prior version, 
permitted the court to shift expenses based on either party’s behavior that was “vexatious, arbitrary, or 
not in good faith”). 
 41. In MBCA section 13.31, the phrase “expenses of the respective parties” generally refers to each 
party’s individual outlay for items such as attorney and expert fees. Although the 1984 and 1999 
versions of section 13.31(b) specified that “expenses of counsel and experts” may be shifted upon 
triggering events, the 2006 amendments to section 13.31(b) provided a more expansive interpretation, 
allowing courts to shift all reasonable “expenses.” The MBCA Annotated comments clarify that the 
shortened reference to “expenses” was designed to reflect the adoption of “expenses” as a defined term 
in the 2006 amendments to section 1.40(9AA). See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 1.40(9AA) (2006) 
(providing the newly-added definition of expenses: “reasonable expenses of any kind that are incurred 
in connection with a matter”); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 13.31 hist. background (2008). 
Compare MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 13.31(b) (1984), and MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 13.31(b) (1999), 
with MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 13.31(b) (2006). 
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specifically states that expenses may be assessed against the corporation if the 
court finds that the corporation did not substantially comply with the key 
requirements of chapter 13,42 or against either side if the court finds such party 
“acted arbitrarily, vexatiously, or not in good faith” regarding the appraisal 
process.43 Finally, although the 1999 version of section 13.31(c) permitted the 
court to spread the costs of counsel fees among all shareholders who benefited 
(if the court had not assessed these fees against the corporation), the 2006 
version of the MBCA expanded this provision to cover all of the shareholders’ 
expenses, rather than just counsel fees.44 In sum, absent some bad conduct by 
the shareholders, the corporation will not only pay the costs of the proceeding, 
but is also at risk to pay the shareholders’ expenses. In contrast, in the absence 
of their own bad conduct, the MBCA guarantees shareholders that they will not 
pay court costs, and may have their expenses either absorbed by the 
corporation or spread among all shareholders demanding appraisal rights. 
The Delaware statute, in contrast, grants courts discretion on how to 
allocate costs of the proceeding. Specifically, Delaware section 262(j) states: 
“[t]he costs of the proceeding may be determined by the Court and taxed upon 
the parties as the Court deems equitable in the circumstances.”45 Although 
section 262(j) authorizes a court to allocate court costs equitably, a pair of early 
Delaware Supreme Court decisions affirmed the Delaware custom of allocating 
court costs to the corporation absent bad faith by the shareholder demanding 
appraisal rights.46 Delaware’s practice has been to follow these cases, which have 
a distinct preference for allocating court costs to the corporation.47 In contrast to 
 
 42. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 13.31(b)(1) (2008). Specifically, the corporation may be required to 
pick up the expenses of the shareholders if the corporation failed to substantially comply with the 
requirements imposed by sections 13.20, 13.22, 13.24, or 13.25. 
 43. Id. § 13.31(b)(2). 
 44. Id. § 13.31(c). See supra note 41 for a related discussion of the 2006 MBCA’s broader approach 
to expenses, as applied to section 13.31(b). 
 45. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(j) (2001). 
 46. Tri-Continental Corp. v. Battye, 74 A.2d 71, 77 (Del. 1950) (“In the absence of a showing of 
bad faith on the part of the dissenting stockholders, or a showing that the statutory procedure was 
made use of for the purpose of being ‘bought off’, we think it reasonable to tax all costs against the 
surviving corporation.”); Meade v. Pac. Gamble Robinson Co., 58 A.2d 415, 418 (Del. 1948) (finding 
“reasonable” the Court of Chancery’s construction of section 262’s predecessor as allowing the court to 
allocate court costs to the corporation absent a showing that the stockholder acted in bad faith, 
incurred unnecessary expenses, or used appraisal as leverage for an unwarranted payout). 
 47. See Cooper v. Pabst Brewing Co., No. 7244, 1993 Del. Ch. LEXIS 91, at *31 (Del. Ch. June 8, 
1993) (citing 262(j) to support a one-sentence assessment of court costs against the corporation when 
the appraisal value was lower than the first-tier tender offer price but exceeded the second-tier merger 
price); In re Appraisal of Shell Oil Co., No. 8080, 1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 199, at *103 (Del. Ch. Dec. 11, 
1990) (citing 262(j) to support a one-sentence assessment of court costs against the corporation when 
the appraisal value exceeded the merger price); Lebman v. Nat’l Union Electric Co., No. 4964, 1980 
Del. Ch. LEXIS 490, at *3–4 (Del. Ch. Nov. 5, 1980) (holding petitioner’s unreasonable but earnest 
belief in the merits of his case showed a lack of bad faith, which was sufficient to shift the costs of the 
appraisal proceeding to the corporation). Cf. Kleinwort Benson Ltd. v. Silgan Corp., No. 11107, 1995 
Del. Ch. LEXIS 75, at *34 (Del. Ch. June 15, 1995) (noting section 262(j) allowed the court to allocate 
costs equitably and splitting the costs of a court-appointed neutral appraisal expert between the parties, 
while allocating the remainder of the court costs to the corporation). 
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the statute’s express grant of judicial discretion regarding court costs, the 
Delaware statute makes no mention of judicial discretion to allocate one party’s 
expert and attorney expenses to its opponent. Instead, the statute’s only 
reference to expenses allows the court discretion to allocate a shareholder’s 
expenses among all shares entitled to appraisal.48 Although section 262(j) is 
silent regarding whether a court may assign expert and attorney expenses to an 
adverse party, Delaware case law recognizes a bad faith equitable exception to 
the rule that parties will bear their own expenses.49 Delaware thereby allows a 
court to assign attorney and expert expenses upon evidence of a party’s 
egregious conduct.50 
B.  Practical Effects and Policy Issues 
In appraisal proceedings under both MBCA section 13.31 and Delaware 
section 262(j), courts could end up dividing court costs and expenses of experts 
and attorneys in a similar manner. For instance, under both statutes, the 
corporation could end up bearing court costs and expenses of the shareholders’ 
experts and attorneys.51 Such a result is far more likely under the MBCA, 
however, both because that statute creates a presumption that the corporation 
will bear the court costs, and because that statute has multiple specific triggers 
that allow the court to assign expenses to the corporation. In Delaware, where 
the statute grants the court discretion to allocate only the court costs, a court 
would likely be motivated to allocate the shareholders’ expert and attorney 
expenses to the corporation only if the corporation engaged in truly egregious 
conduct.52 Similarly, shareholders demanding their appraisal rights could find 
 
 48. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(j) (2001). 
 49. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 684 A.2d 289, 301 (Del. 1996) (“In the absence of an 
equitable exception, the plaintiff in an appraisal proceeding should bear the burden of paying its own 
expert witnesses and attorneys.”). 
 50. The equitable exception is narrow, but the Supreme Court of Delaware recently found it 
appropriate to allocate expert and attorney expenses against the corporation in Montgomery Cellular 
Holding Co., Inc. v. Dobler, based on the corporation’s continuous bad conduct throughout the 
appraisal proceeding. 880 A.2d 206, 228–29 (Del. 2005) (“Given the overwhelming evidence that the 
respondents repeatedly acted in bad faith to obstruct if not prevent a fair valuation,” the court was 
“constrained to conclude that the Court of Chancery abused its discretion by declining to award 
attorneys’ and expert witness fees.”). Note also that the Court of Chancery has split on whether a 
Delaware procedural rule permitting Delaware trial courts discretion to fix and assess experts’ fees 
applies to appraisal proceedings. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8906 (1998). Compare In re Sunbelt 
Beverage Corp. S’holder Litig., No. 16089-CC, 2010 Del. Ch. LEXIS 1, at *57–61 (Del. Ch. Jan. 5, 2010) 
(shifting a shareholder’s expert expenses to the corporation pursuant to section 8906, and failing to 
identify any bad conduct to justify the shift of those expert expenses), with Taylor v. Am. Specialty 
Retailing Grp., Inc., No. 19239, 2003 Del. Ch. LEXIS 75, at *44 (Del. Ch. July 25, 2003) (holding that 
section 8906 was not available in appraisal proceedings, because section 8906 “is inconsistent with the 
more specific fee shifting provisions of [section] 262(j)”). 
 51. See supra note 47 (illustrating that, although Delaware courts typically assign court costs 
against the corporation, section 262(j) does not mandate this result); supra note 50 (explaining 
Delaware’s equitable exception, which permits shifting of expert and attorney fees in appraisal 
proceedings in certain limited circumstances). 
 52. See infra note 55. 
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themselves in the same financial position under both statutes if the court 
required the corporation to shoulder the court costs and allocated the 
shareholders’ expenses among all shareholders demanding appraisal. 
Although similar outcomes could eventuate, a few differences between the 
statutes remain. One is that the statutorily-driven MBCA gives more concrete 
assurances to shareholders regarding the assignment of costs and expenses than 
does the Delaware statute. This is particularly true regarding expert and 
attorney expenses, which Delaware case law, but not its appraisal statute, 
permits to be assigned in certain limited situations.53 As a result, the appraisal 
remedy becomes a more predictable and viable option for shareholders 
demanding appraisal rights under statutes that follow this aspect of the MBCA 
than those that follow Delaware’s appraisal provision. Not only does the 
MBCA’s specific language allocating costs and expenses provide comfort to 
shareholders, but the MBCA’s language identifying bad conduct by either of 
the parties is also helpful to shareholders as it provides parameters for the 
court’s discretionary allocation of costs and expenses. As the comment to 
section 13.31 explains, that discretion is designed to encourage the parties to 
settle: “[T]he purpose of all these grants of discretion with respect to expenses 
is to increase the incentives of both sides to proceed in good faith under this 
chapter to attempt to resolve their disagreement without the need of a formal 
judicial appraisal of the value of shares.”54 While it is arguable that the 
Delaware statutory language authorizing the court to allocate costs of the 
proceeding (but not expert and attorney expenses) as the court deems 
“equitable” may similarly motivate all parties to proceed in good faith, the lack 
of specificity regarding what constitutes bad conduct,55 and the narrow 
construction Delaware courts apply to this equitable exception, reduce the 
likelihood that either party will be forced to bear the other side’s expenses. 
This, in turn, may provide less incentive for the parties to settle.56 
The primary policy effect of these competing models is straightforward: the 
MBCA makes pursuing the appraisal demand more economically feasible than 
 
 53. See supra note 50. 
 54. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 13.31 official cmt. (2008). 
 55. For a number of years, Delaware courts have acknowledged an equitable exception to section 
262(j)’s silence on expense shifting. See, e.g., Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 684 A.2d 289, 301 (Del. 
1996). Yet only recently have they begun to articulate the kinds of behavior constituting the exception 
in the context of an appraisal proceeding. In Montgomery Cellular, the Supreme Court of Delaware 
explained that Delaware courts have not adopted a “single, comprehensive definition of ‘bad faith’” 
that justifies expense shifting. 880 A.2d at 227. The court found, however, that the corporation’s 
destruction of evidence, failure to respond to discovery requests, presentation of a “fatally flawed” 
expert evaluation, and chief executive officer’s telling of lies under oath compelled a finding of bad 
faith. Id. at 227–29. 
 56. Compare MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 13.31(b) (2008) (defining a broad range of behavior that 
will trigger a court’s power to allocate expenses, that is, if the corporation “did not substantially 
comply” with specified requirements or if the corporation or one or more shareholders acted 
“arbitrarily, vexatiously, or not in good faith with respect to the rights” granted by chapter 13), with 
Montgomery Cellular, 880 A.2d at 227 (explaining that the “bad faith exception is applied in 
‘extraordinary circumstances’ as a tool to deter abusive litigation”). 
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does Delaware’s appraisal provision. Similar to the prepayment provisions, 
critics of the MBCA might question why the statute encourages shareholder 
litigation, particularly when appraisal rights have significant downsides for the 
corporation and for all other shareholders.57 Moreover, critics might ask why 
this litigation, as opposed to other shareholder litigation, should be made 
“economically feasible.” Supporters, on the other hand, might counter that, 
absent some substantial financial relief, appraisal rights are merely a theoretical 
right for those who own only a small number of shares.58 Under the Delaware 
model, the shareholder and, perhaps, the shareholder’s attorney, must be ready 
to absorb the high costs of an appraisal action if the parties do not settle. 
Furthermore, the MBCA arguably does a better job of encouraging the parties 
to settle: the MBCA’s multiple specific triggers make it more likely that a court 
will require one party to shoulder its opponent’s expert and attorney expenses 
than under Delaware’s limited equitable exception. The threat of bearing both 
sides’ expenses creates an incentive for both parties to settle, rather than to 
engage in a full-blown appraisal proceeding. 
C.  Reaction from the State Legislatures 
Thirty-six jurisdictions, or seventy-one percent, have adopted MBCA 
section 13.31(a)’s approach, which creates a rebuttable presumption that the 
corporation will bear the court costs of the appraisal proceeding.59 Furthermore, 
thirty-nine jurisdictions, or seventy-six percent, have adopted MBCA section 
13.31(b)’s approach, which contains an unwritten assumption that parties will 
bear their own expert and attorney expenses,60 but allows a court to allocate 
expenses equitably upon a finding that either party has engaged in certain 
specified bad conduct.61 In contrast, only seven jurisdictions have adopted 
 
 57. See Siegel, supra note 10, at 79, 97–98 (noting that a sufficient number of appraisal demands 
may trip covenants that permit a party to the appraisal-triggering transaction to back out of the deal, or 
the appraisal demand may disqualify the transaction from the desired tax treatment); see also supra 
note 11. 
 58. See Siegel, supra note 10, at 79–80 (noting that, without some financial assistance, the high cost 
of exercising appraisal rights makes the remedy feasible only to shareholders who own a large number 
of shares). 
 59. Altogether, thirty-six jurisdictions apply section 13.31(a)’s approach, including thirty-two that 
largely adopt the MBCA language, and four other jurisdictions reach the same result via different 
statutory language. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 13.31 statutory comparison (2008) for a list of 
the thirty-two jurisdictions. Arizona’s statutory language generally mirrors the MBCA, presuming the 
corporation bears court costs, except it inverts the presumption (allocating court costs to the 
shareholder) when the appraisal value does not materially exceed the amount offered. See ARIZ. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 10-1331 (West through 2010 2d Reg. Sess. and 9th Spec. Sess.). The Maryland, New 
Mexico, and Rhode Island statutes all reach roughly the same outcome as MBCA section 13.31(a) via 
alternate statutory language, presuming that the corporation will bear court costs, but granting courts 
discretion to allocate costs equitably in the face of bad conduct. See MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS 
§ 3-211(d) (West through 2010 Reg. Sess.); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-15-4(G) (West through 2010 2d Reg. 
Sess. and 2d Spec. Sess.); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-1.2-1202(g) (West through Jan. 2010 Sess.).  
 60. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
 61. Thirty-nine jurisdictions apply section 13.31(b)’s approach, including thirty-five that adopt the 
MBCA language, and four other jurisdictions that reach the same result via different statutory 
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Delaware’s approach, which allows courts to allocate the court costs 
“equitably,”62 and only five jurisdictions mimic Delaware’s absence of statutory 
guidance regarding assessing expert and attorney expenses against an adverse 
party.63 The minority of jurisdictions that do not adopt the approach of either 
the MBCA or Delaware have three different views on how to allocate costs,64 
 
language. The same thirty-two states that are mentioned supra, in note 59, as adopting section 
13.31(a)’s language, are joined by Illinois, Indiana, and North Carolina in adopting section 13.31(b)’s 
language. See 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11.70(i)(1)–(2) (West through 2010 Reg. Sess.); IND. CODE ANN. 
§ 23-1-44-20(b) (West through 2010 2d Reg. Sess.); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 55-13-31(b) (West through 
2010 Reg. Sess.). Arizona’s statutory language generally mirrors the MBCA section 13.31(b) on 
expenses, but adds a section allowing courts to allocate expenses to the shareholder if the appraisal 
price does not materially exceed the price offered by the corporation. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-
1331(B) (West through 2010 2d Reg. Sess. and 9th Spec. Sess.). In addition, New Jersey, Maryland, and 
New Mexico each clarify that expert and attorney expenses are not included in the court’s costs 
allocation, thereby implying a presumption that parties will bear their own expenses. See N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 14A:11-10 (West 2010); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 3-211(d)(2) (West through 2010 
Reg. Sess.); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-15-4(G) (West through 2010 2d Reg. Sess. and 2d Spec. Sess.). But 
these jurisdictions allow courts discretion to allocate attorney and expert expenses equitably if the 
corporation did not make an offer, or if the offer was not in good faith (New Jersey) or was materially 
exceeded by the court appraisal price (Maryland, New Mexico). Cf. Rhode Island’s approach, infra 
note 65. 
 62. Two states, Kansas and Oklahoma, adopted Delaware section 262(j)’s language. Five more 
states, Indiana, North Carolina, New Jersey, Ohio, and Texas, granted courts the power to apportion 
court costs “equitably” between the parties, but do so in statutory language that does not track 
Delaware section 262(j). Courts in all seven states have split costs variously or allocated all costs to one 
party based on the equitable grant contained in the state’s appraisal statute. Compare Vernon v. 
Commerce Fin. Corp., 85 P.3d 211, 216 (Kan. Ct. App. 2004) (finding the district court did not abuse its 
discretion in splitting costs evenly between both parties because the statute allowed for equitable 
allocation of costs), and N.J. Sports & Exposition Auth. v. Del Tufo, 554 A.2d 878, 881–82 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 1989) (approving of the trial court’s decision to split the court-appointed appraiser’s fee, 
but finding insufficient support in the record for the amount of the fee), with Moore v. New Ammest, 
Inc., 630 P.2d 167, 171 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981) (noting the trial court allocated costs to the corporation) 
overruled on other grounds by Arnaud v. Stockgrowers State Bank, 992 P.2d 216, 220 (Kan. 1999), and 
Gannon v. Baker, 830 S.W.2d 706, 709 (Tex. App. 1992) (leaving undisturbed the trial court’s allocation 
of costs against the corporation). 
 63. As noted supra note 62, Kansas and Oklahoma adopt Delaware section 262(j)’s language. 
Three more states, Louisiana, Ohio, and Texas, reflect a similar approach by failing to provide for 
expert and attorney expense allocation using statutory language different from Delaware’s. Scant case 
law exists illuminating the manner in which courts in these five states actually allocate expert and 
attorney expenses, although at least one court refused a shareholder’s request to shift expenses. See, 
e.g., Woolf v. Universal Fid. Life Ins. Co., 849 P.2d 1093, 1097 (Okla. Civ. App. 1992) (refusing to shift 
expenses based on the lack of authorization in Oklahoma’s appraisal statute); cf. Rhode Island’s 
statutory approach, infra note 65. 
 64. States not following the MBCA or Delaware’s approach to court costs either (1) presume that 
parties will bear their own costs, such as Alaska and New York, which create a statutory presumption 
that parties will bear their own court costs, but allow a court to assign all or part of the costs if the court 
finds a party engaged in certain specified bad conduct; (2) remove any presumption that either party 
will bear the costs incurred by the other side, such as Illinois and Louisiana, which use statutory 
language that instructs courts to apportion costs based on whether the appraisal price exceeds the 
corporation’s offer or the shareholder’s estimation of share value; or (3) adopt a hybrid approach, such 
as California’s statute, which requires the court to allocate court costs equitably between the parties, 
unless the appraisal price exceeds the corporation’s offer, in which case the statute directs the court to 
allocate the court costs against the corporation. See ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.580(e) (West 2010); N.Y. 
BUS. CORP. LAW § 623(h)(7), (e) (West 2010); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11.70(i) (West through 2010 
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and two different approaches to allocating expenses.65 Finally, two jurisdictions 
have no statutory provision governing the allocation of appraisal costs and 
expenses.66 More than two-thirds of jurisdictions have adopted the MBCA’s 
statutory treatment of costs and expenses, thereby showing the legislatures’ 
clear preference for the MBCA’s long-standing codification of these issues over 
Delaware’s countervailing provisions. 
V 
THE MARKET-OUT EXCEPTION 
A.  The Statutory Language 
As noted above, MBCA section 13.02(a) lists the transactions that trigger a 
shareholder’s appraisal rights. Section 13.02(b)(1), however, creates an 
exception to appraisal rights for shares that can be sold in a liquid market;67 this 
exception is commonly known as the “market-out exception.” The rationale 
underlying this exception is that at the announcement of an appraisal-triggering 
transaction, the market for that corporation’s stock is operating with maximum 
efficiency and serves as a reliable determination of the fair value of the 
corporation’s shares.68 Section 13.02(b)(4) creates an exception to the market-
out exception if the corporate transaction is an “interested transaction.”69 As a 
result, under the MBCA, the market-out exception to appraisal rights applies 
only if the market is sufficiently liquid and the transaction does not fall within 
the definition of an “interested transaction.” The comment to section 13.02 
explains these two requirements: 
 
Reg. Sess.); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:131(G) (West through 2009 Reg. Sess.); CAL. CORP. CODE § 
1305(e) (West through 2009 Reg. Sess.). 
 65. States not following the MBCA or Delaware’s approach to expenses either (1) presume that 
parties will bear their own expenses, such as Alaska and New York, which presume that parties will 
bear their own expert and attorney expenses, but allow a court to assign all or part of the expenses if 
the court finds a party engaged in certain specified bad conduct; or (2) adopt one of two hybrid 
approaches, such as California’s statute, which provides no presumption of expense allocation, unless 
the appraisal price exceeds the corporation’s offer by 125%, in which case the statute allows the court 
to equitably allocate expenses against the corporation; and Rhode Island’s statute, which allows a court 
discretion to allocate a party’s expert expenses equitably if the corporation did not make an offer, or if 
the offer was materially exceeded by the court appraisal price, but does not provide for the allocation 
of attorney’s fees. See ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.580(e) (West 2010); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 623(h)(7), 
(e) (West 2010); CAL. CORP. CODE § 1305(e) (West through 2009 Reg. Sess.); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-1.2-
1202(g) (West through Jan. 2010 Sess.). 
 66. The District of Columbia and Missouri have no statutory provisions for court costs or expenses 
of experts or attorneys. 
 67. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 13.02(b)(1) (2008). 
 68. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 13.02 cmt. at 2 (2008) (explaining that the announcement 
of an appraisal-triggering transaction encourages market professionals and other interested parties to 
evaluate the transaction and submit competing proposals if the corporation’s proposed transaction is 
inadequate). 
 69. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 13.02(b)(4) (2008). The definition of an “interested transaction” is 
set forth in section 13.01(5.1). 
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The premise of the market out is that the market must be liquid and the valuation 
assigned to the relevant shares must be ‘reliable.’ Section 13.02(b)(1) is designed to 
assure liquidity. . . . [S]ection 13.02(b)(4) is designed to assure reliability by 
recognizing that the market price of, or consideration for, shares of a corporation . . . 
may be subject to influences where a corporation’s management, controlling 
shareholders or directors have conflicting interests that could . . . adversely affect the 
consideration that otherwise could have been expected. Section 13.02(b)(4) thus 
provides that the market out will not apply in those instances where the transaction 
constitutes an interested transaction.70 
Like the MBCA, Delaware’s appraisal statute contains a market-out 
exception;71 unlike the MBCA,72 however, Delaware’s market-out exception is 
not limited only to disinterested transactions.73 
B.  Practical Effects and Policy Issues 
Prior to the MBCA revisions in 1999, no jurisdiction had adopted a market-
out exception that was limited to non-conflict transactions.74 Additionally, as of 
1999, state appraisal statutes were fairly evenly divided between those that 
contained a market-out exception75 and those that did not:76 twenty-six states 
had a market-out exception, whereas twenty-four states, the District of 
Columbia, and the MBCA did not. Because the premise of appraisal rights is to 
afford shareholders whose corporations engage in certain transactions the fair 
value of their stock in cash, supporters of the market-out exception argued that 
a sufficiently liquid market offers shareholders the fair value of their stock in 
cash without either the shareholder or the corporation incurring the large costs 
attendant to an appraisal process.77 Opponents of the market-out exception, 
 
 70. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 13.02 cmt. at 3 (2008). 
 71. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 262(b)(1) (2001). 
 72. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 13.02(b)(1) (2008). 
 73. Delaware’s appraisal statute does have other exceptions to the market-out exception. For 
example, Delaware’s market-out exception does not apply to cash-out mergers. As such, depending on 
the merger consideration, appraisal rights may be available for more Delaware mergers than for 
mergers effected pursuant to the MBCA. See DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 262(b)(2) (2001) (reinstating 
appraisal rights despite the existence of a liquid market based on the nature of the consideration the 
shareholder receives in the appraisal-triggering transaction); see also id. § 262(b)(3) (reinstating 
appraisal rights for short-form mergers under section 253). 
 74. Siegel, supra note 10, at 79, 124. 
 75. The twenty-six jurisdictions that had a market-out exception in 1999 were: Alaska, Arizona, 
California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, 
Michigan, North Carolina, Nevada, New Jersey, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, 
South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Wisconsin. 
 76. In addition to the MBCA, twenty-five jurisdictions did not have a market-out exception in 
1999. The states without a market-out exception in 1999 were: Alabama, Arkansas, Connecticut, 
District of Columbia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Idaho, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, 
Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, South 
Dakota, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming. 
 77. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 13.02 cmt. at 2 (1999) (“Moreover, the market exception 
reflects an evaluation that the uncertainty, costs and time commitment involved in any appraisal 
proceeding are not warranted where shareholders can sell their shares in an efficient, fair and liquid 
market.”). 
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however, directly challenged the premise that the stock market always offers 
fair value.78 
Opponents of the market-out exception contended that market value and 
fair value are not necessarily synonymous under all circumstances. They 
proffered concerns that the market may be “demoralized,”79 be reflective only 
of publicly available information,80 or only a mirror of the transaction price,81 
rather than of the stock’s fair value. The Committees that drafted the 1978 and 
1984 versions of MBCA chapter 13 agreed with these concerns: the 1978 
Committee repealed the market-out exception that had been enacted in the 
1969 version of the MBCA,82 and the 1984 Committee affirmed that decision.83 
In 1999, the Committee recognized the concerns articulated in prior drafts 
of chapter 13 that confining shareholders to the market price could, in some 
circumstances, deny shareholders the fair value of their stock.84 The 1999 
Committee, however, also believed that the market-out exception had great 
value even if it was not reliable in all circumstances. Specifically, the strengths 
of the market-out are that it eliminates the uncertainty, large costs, and time 
commitment involved in any appraisal proceeding. Furthermore, although the 
market may not always achieve a perfect price, the variables involved in an 
appraisal proceeding surely do not produce an ideal price either,85 and are 
indisputably attendant by large financial and time costs. Thus, deciding against 
a market-out simply because some, but not all, transactions may make the 
market price potentially unfair seemed too crude of a choice.86 Rather than a 
wholesale acceptance or rejection of the market-out critiques, the 1999 
 
 78. See generally Ronald J. Gilson & Reiner H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 
70 VA. L. REV. 549 (1984) (discussing the efficient market hypothesis and whether the market price 
represents fair value of the company’s stock). 
 79. See Conard, supra note 40, at 2595–96 (citing the prevalence of demoralized markets in the 
1970s as a reason for removing the market-out exception from the MBCA). 
 80. See Siegel, supra note 10, at 126 (recognizing the possibility that if the market only reflects 
publicly available information, only management will be in a position to know if stock is undervalued). 
 81. See Conrad, supra note 40, at 2595–96 (stating it is impossible for the market price to reflect the 
value of shares “excluding any appreciation or depreciation in anticipation of the corporate change” 
that gave rise to appraisal rights). 
 82. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 73(c) (1969); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 73(c) (1978). 
 83. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 13.02 (1984) (not including a market-out exception). 
 84. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 13.02 cmt. at 3 (2008) (noting that, although the premise 
of the market-out is that the value offered by the market is deemed reliable, the market might not be a 
reliable indicator of the fair value of stock in certain appraisal-triggering transactions). 
 85. Determinations of fair value are inextricably tied to the methodology used to calculate fair 
value. Different methodologies ascribe different weights to each variable and incorporate different 
assumptions within the valuation model. In Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., the Delaware Supreme Court 
overruled the “Delaware block” method for determining fair value, holding that such a determination 
“requires consideration of all relevant factors involving the value of the company.” 457 A.2d 701, 713 
(Del. 1983). 
 86. Conflict transactions may confine shareholders to a demoralized market, but absent a conflict, 
decisions by directors that are consistent with directors’ fiduciary duties should provide shareholders 
with the approximate fair value of their transaction. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 13.02 cmt. at 3 
(2008); see also Siegel, supra note 10, at 127. 
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Committee identified those circumstances that might generate a demoralized 
market, an uninformed market, or a market that merely mirrored the 
transaction price, and concluded that such concerns were significant only if the 
appraisal-triggering transaction was a conflict-of-interest transaction. As a 
result, the Committee adopted a market-out exception to appraisal rights, but, 
through its additional exception for conflict-of-interest transactions, the 
Committee reinstated appraisal rights for those transactions when the market is, 
arguably, unreliable. Delaware’s adoption of a market-out without any 
exception for conflict transactions recognizes the valuable aspects of the 
market-out exception, but presumably accepts that the market is sufficiently 
reliable so as to not require an exception for conflict transactions. 
C.  Reaction from the State Legislatures 
Given that jurisdictions in 1999 were fairly evenly divided between those 
that did and did not adopt a market-out exception,87 it is interesting to consider 
not only whether jurisdictions have limited their market-out exceptions to non-
conflict transactions, but also whether the market-out has increasingly attracted 
opponents or supporters. Since 1999, ten jurisdictions added a market-out 
exception.88 Thus, in the ten years from 1999 to 2009, the number of market-out 
provisions increased from twenty-six to thirty-six jurisdictions, an impressive 
38.5% growth. This large increase may reflect either legislative comfort with the 
market and its numerous benefits,89 an understanding of the downsides of 
appraisal rights,90 or both. Indeed, although there may be possible failings in a 
market price, the appraised value, as discussed above, is certainly not a perfect 
number. Therefore, when faced with two arguably imperfect determinations of 
share value, it would be reasonable to select the most cost-efficient valuation. 
Thirty-six legislatures, or 70.5%, have done so by embracing a market-out 
exception. 
Of these thirty-six market-out exceptions, eleven,91 or approximately 30.5%, 
have embraced the MBCA concept that the market-out exception should be 
inapplicable if the appraisal-triggering transaction is a conflict transaction.92 The 
 
 87. See supra notes 75–76 (listing jurisdictions with and without a market-out exception in 1999 and 
noting that numerically, they were fairly evenly divided). 
 88. The states that added a market-out exception after 1999 are: Connecticut, Idaho, Iowa, 
Massachusetts, Mississippi, New York, North Dakota, South Dakota, West Virginia, and Wyoming. 
 89. See supra notes 68, 77 and accompanying text. 
 90. See supra notes 11, 58 and accompanying text; Siegel supra note 10, at 109 (explaining that 
allowing appraisal rights in non-conflict transactions runs counter to the normal presumption of the 
business judgment rule). 
 91. The states that limit the market-out to non-conflict transactions are: Connecticut, Florida, 
Idaho, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, South Dakota, Virginia, and West Virginia. 
 92. Each of these statutes either (1) reinstates appraisal rights if the transaction is an “interested 
transaction” when the definition of interested is provided in the definitional section of the statute 
(Connecticut, Mississippi, Virginia); or (2) lists specific instances of conflict, modeled after the 
definition of an interested transaction in MBCA section 13.01(5.1), which render appraisal rights 
available (Florida, Idaho, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, South Dakota, West Virginia). See infra note 99. 
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eleven jurisdictions that limit their market-out exceptions to non-conflict 
transactions consist of four of the twenty-six jurisdictions that had a market-out 
in 1999 and later amended their statutes to include a conflict exception,93 and 
seven jurisdictions from the ten that added a market-out exception since 1999.94 
Thus, because a significant number of jurisdictions (seventy percent) that added 
a market-out exception since 1999 embraced the further exception for conflict-
of-interest transactions, there was a greater inclination toward the conflict 
exception among those legislatures that added a market-out rather than among 
those who already had a market-out. Such a result is not surprising; those 
legislatures that already had adopted a market-out exception before 1999 had 
obviously achieved some level of comfort with this exception, and were 
therefore less receptive to the Committee’s argument that an unqualified 
market-out is flawed. 
On the other hand, Delaware and twenty-four other jurisdictions have a 
market-out exception that does not contain an exception for conflict 
transactions. The relatively recent addition of the conflict exception raises the 
initial question whether these twenty-five legislatures have rejected the 
MBCA’s conflict exception or whether these legislatures have simply not yet 
considered the issue. The statistics, however, strongly suggest that most of these 
twenty-five jurisdictions have considered and rejected the conflict-of-interest 
limitation. First, one might presume that the ten states that added a market-out 
exception since 1999 also considered whether to limit that exception by adding 
a conflict transaction; as noted above, three of these states chose not to add the 
conflict limitation.95 Second, because seventeen of the twenty-six jurisdictions 
that had market-out exceptions in 1999 have since amended aspects of their 
appraisal provisions without adding a conflict exception,96 one might again 
suspect that this group also considered and rejected a conflict exception. As a 
result, one might presumptively conclude that twenty of these jurisdictions 
rejected adding a conflict exception to their market-out exceptions. This leaves 
only two other groups of jurisdictions with market-out exceptions for which the 
inferences are less apparent: three jurisdictions amended aspects of their 
corporate statutes without amending any aspects of their appraisal provisions,97 
 
Finally, the Massachusetts statute lists specific instances of conflict that reinstate appraisal rights, but 
the enumerated instances of conflict differ from those listed in the MBCA. See infra note 102 and 
accompanying text. 
 93. These jurisdictions are Florida, Maine, Maryland, and Virginia. 
 94. The jurisdictions that added a market-out limited to non-conflict transactions are Connecticut, 
Idaho, Iowa, Massachusetts, Mississippi, South Dakota, and West Virginia. 
 95. See supra note 88 and accompanying text. The three jurisdictions that added a market-out 
exception, but did not limit the market-out to non-conflict transactions are: New York, North Dakota, 
and Wyoming. 
 96. These jurisdictions are: California, Colorado, Delaware, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Michigan, 
North Carolina, Nevada, New Jersey, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, 
Texas, and Wisconsin. 
 97. These jurisdictions are: Alaska, Arizona, and Utah. 
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and two jurisdictions’ legislatures have not yet amended any aspect of their 
respective corporate statutes, including their appraisal provisions.98 
One can only speculate as to the reasons why a majority of jurisdictions 
have chosen to embrace the market-out exception without limiting that market-
out to non-conflict transactions. Some legislatures might not be convinced that 
the market-out needs this further exception, and thus, have chosen to follow 
Delaware’s approach. Others might embrace the soundness of the Committee’s 
argument, but might want more time to analyze the experiences other 
jurisdictions have with this exception before adopting this novel approach. Still 
others might agree with the Committee’s position, but be concerned that the 
definition of “interested transaction” in the MBCA is not easy to master: the 
definition takes up over one and a half pages; has definitions of “interested 
person,” “beneficial owner,” and “excluded shares”; and is tripped by 
ownership of stock, power, and position in the corporation.99 Such a complex 
definition might generate concerns about whether lawyers could determine, 
with the certainty required for disclosure in the proxy materials,100 whether 
appraisal rights are, in fact, available due to the conflict exception. If such a 
determination is difficult, and lawyers err in their judgment, the consequences 
to the corporation could be significant.101 Perhaps the complexity of the 
MBCA’s definition is what caused Massachusetts to embrace the logic of a 
conflict exception but to devise a simplified definition of conflict.102 Regardless 
of the reason, the decision of twenty-five legislatures to follow Delaware’s 
market-out exception has the concomitant effect of decreasing the availability 
of appraisal rights, as shareholders will be relegated to the market for both 
conflict and non-conflict transactions. 
 
 98. These jurisdictions are: Tennessee and Louisiana. 
 99. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 13.01(5.1) (2008). 
 100. Corporations must disclose a variety of information in their proxy materials. Schedule 14A, 
Item 3 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (’34 Act), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78 (West 2010), specifically 
requires corporations to disclose whether appraisal rights are available and the procedure for perfecting 
appraisal rights. A failure to disclose accurately whether appraisal rights are available is a violation of § 
14(a) of the ‘34 Act. 
 101. Such incorrect disclosure might lead to a violation of § 14(a) of the ‘34 Act and § 10(b) of the 
‘34 Act, as well as have serious other consequences under state law. See Berger v. Pubco Corp., 976 
A.2d 132, 144 (Del. 2009) (granting shareholders quasi-appraisal rights when a corporation’s initial 
disclosure accompanying notice of appraisal rights was inadequate). 
 102. The Massachusetts statute provides that appraisal rights are not available so long as 
shareholders receive cash or marketable securities and “no director, officer or controlling shareholder 
has a direct or indirect material financial interest in the merger other than in his capacity as (i) a 
shareholder of the corporation, (ii) a director, officer, employee or consultant of either the merging or 
surviving corporation or of any affiliate of the surviving corporation if his financial interest is pursuant 
to bona fide arrangements with either corporation or any such affiliate, or (iii) in any other capacity so 
long as the shareholder owns not more than five percent of the voting shares of all classes and series of 
the corporation in the aggregate.” MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156D, § 13.02 (West through 2010 2d 
Annual Sess.). Note that this definition, although simpler than its counterpart in the MBCA, creates its 
own problems by, for example, failing to define “material.” 
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VI 
CONCLUSION 
Appraisal rights are, indisputably, controversial. The controversy is broad, 
ranging from disputes over the function of appraisal rights to arguments 
assessing their desirability. It is therefore not surprising that the appraisal 
provisions in the MBCA and the Delaware statute highlight this controversy 
through specific differences in their appraisal provisions that expand or contract 
the availability of appraisal rights, or make these rights more or less feasible for 
shareholders. Delaware’s market-out exception and single appraisal trigger 
clearly decrease the frequency of appraisal rights. Moreover, in those instances 
where shareholders have appraisal rights, Delaware treats that appraisal 
litigation like all other litigation; because no litigation is shareholder-friendly, 
only shareholders with large amounts of stock normally demand appraisal rights 
in Delaware.103 The MBCA’s appraisal provisions, in contrast, are more 
shareholder-friendly: there are numerous appraisal triggers, the market-out 
exception is available only in non-conflict transactions, and shareholders benefit 
from the statute’s provisions on prepayment and allocation of costs. The vast 
majority of jurisdictions have supported most of the MBCA’s key appraisal 
provisions, thereby making the remedy both available and viable for 
shareholders. 
 
 
 103. See Siegel, supra note 10, at 80 n.3 (citing Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283, 1297–
98, 1301 (2d Cir. 1976) (Mansfield, J., concurring) rev’d on other grounds, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) 
(illustrating that, in Delaware, only shareholders owning a large number of shares will find appraisal 
financially beneficial)). 
